The Cripps Mission was a British Cabinet mission to India seeking to gain the support of Indian politicians for Britain’s war effort in exchange for Dominion status. The Indian National Congress had withdrawn from government in 1939 after Britain unilaterally declared India to be at a state of war with the Axis Powers. The Indian National Congress were now adamant that only a guarantee of full independence would be sufficient for it to support Britain in the war.

Cripps expressed his misgivings about the mission in a letter to Churchill qouted below:

“1. From all appearances it seems certain that Congress will turn down the proposals. There are a multitude of currents and cross-currents but they are selecting the question of Defence as their main platform for opposition.
2. The Muslim League who are prepared to accept will no doubt if Congress refuse also find some reason for refusal as will all other sections of opinion.
3. There has been almost unanimous protest from representatives including the European community as to the complete retention of the existing control of Defence by His Majesty’s Government. (I should however add that Viceroy doubts whether this is representative of attitude of Europeans in Bengal.) This protest arises partly from a misunderstanding of the position which I have tried to clarify in successive stages and partly because people feel that the maximum ol appeal must be made to the Indian people by their leaders if they are to be galvanised to their Defence, and that unless those leaders can claim some control over their Defence of India they camiot make their appeal effective to the Indian people.
4. Except in the Punjab and North-West Frontier present situation as to morale amongst the Indian and in many cases the European population is deplorable. The anti-British feeling is running very strong and our prestige is lower than it has ever been owing to events in Burma and more particularly in Singapore. The stories circulating on all sides as to Malaya and Singapore convey an impression of incompetence which is indeed alarming.
5. Unrest is growing amongst the population, and unemployment is developing in certain centres. The food situation is causing disquiet and the refugee problem in view of the complaints of discrimination against the Indians, of which the administration is accused, and which I have asked the Viceroy to look into, is a source of serious intensification of anti-British feeling.
6. The outlook so far as the internal situation goes is exceedingly bad and if we cannot persuade the Indian leaders to come in now and help us we shall have to resort to suppression which may develop to such a scale that it may well get out of hand even though we use for this purpose a part of our available military resources.
7. I give you this picture so that you may judge as to the importance from a Defence point of view of getting the Indian leaders into the job of controlling, encouraging and leading the Indian people. This cannot be done under existing circumstances by any Britisher.
8. The present situation as to the Defence Minister is that the new words which were drafted by the Viceroy were put into paragraph (e) with the full consent of the Commander-in-Chief who consulted with the Viceroy upon this point without my being present.
9. An explanatory letter was sent to the main communities containing the following material paragraph: “It must be clearly understood that the final definition of the division of responsibilities between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India is as stated in paragraph (e) of the document. The Viceroy would be prepared to consult with Indian leaders on this basis to see whether it were possible to designate an Indian to some office connected with the Government of India’s defence responsibilities without in any way impinging upon the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief either in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the armed forces in India or as the Member of the Executive Council in charge of Defence”.
10. I have consequently addressed a letter (text in my next following telegram), suggesting interview of Congress leaders with Commander-in-Chief.
11. If some adjustment can be so arrived at will you give me full authority subject to agreement of Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy.”

Source: Stafford Cripps, ‘Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)’, cited in Nicholas Mansergh & E. W. R. Lumby (eds.), Transfer of Power, vol. I (Cambridge University Press: 1970), p. 600-602